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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellees (Armstrongs) concur with Appellant (Pickett) that 
this court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Anno. 78-2-2(3) and Utah Const. Art VIII, §§ 1 and 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Armstrongs concur that Pickett has raised the five issues 
stated in his brief. Armstrongs ask the court to address two 
additional issues. They are, 1) whether Pickett properly 
preserved his issues before the trial court, and 2) whether 
opposing counsel may proceed on behalf of Pickett without showing 
authority to do so. Because both of these issues were raised 
before this court this court will be the only court to determine 
whether the Armstrongs assertions are correct. The standard this 
court should use in considering these issues is "correctness," 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), i.e. is Armstrongs' 
position on these issues correct. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
41-12a-304. No-fault tort immunity ineffective. 
The owner of a motor vehicle on which owner's or 
operatorfs security is required under Section 
41-12a-301 who fails to have the security in effect at 
the time of an accident does not have immunity from 
tort liability under Subsection 31A-22-309(1). This 
owner is personally liable for the payment of the 
benefits provided for under Section 31A-22-307 to 
persons entitled to receive them under Section 
31A-22-308. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a negligence claim. Pickett ran a stop sign while 
intoxicated, injured the Armstrongs and totaled their vehicle. 
They sued to recover their damages. 
Course of Proceedings 
After Armstrongs filed suit they were unable to locate 
Pickett and obtained an order from the court allowing service by 
mail. Counsel answered for Pickett. When Pickett refused to 
appear for his deposition Armstrongs filed a motion to compel and 
then a motion for sanctions. Each was granted. As a result of 
the motion for sanctions Pickett's pleadings were stricken. The 
matter was then tried to the court on damages. Armstrongs were 
awarded judgments for their personal injuries and property 
damage. Pickett appealed. 
Disposition at Trial Court 
The matter was tried to the court on damages. The trial 
court awarded special, general and punitive damages. Pickett 
objected to some proposed findings of fact in general but not 
with specific citations to the exhibits, the transcript or the 
law. Those objections were not noticed for consideration by the 
trial court and the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment proposed by Armstrongs were entered. 
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RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
On January 7, 1996 Pickett, driving his Chevrolet Suburban, 
struck the Armstrongs' Suburban. (Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp 
no. 1, 4). Pickett was arrested and charged with driving under 
the influence. (Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp no. 5, 14). At 
the scene of the collision Pickett could not stand, even with the 
help of witnesses. (Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp no. 8). 
Pickett's blood alcohol was between .12 and .14. (Record at 578, 
page/line 26/19) . 
At the time of the Pickett collision Dan Armstrong was 41. 
(Appendix at Tab a, bate stamp no. 1). In the collision Dan 
Armstrong was struck in the lower back. (Record at 578, page/line 
3 0/22-24) . Dan Armstrong had suffered an injury to his back in a 
prior motor vehicle accident. (Record at 578, page/line 31/25-
32/2). The injury to his back was exacerbated by the collision 
at issue in this case. As a result of the prior injury Dan 
usually woke up between 3:30 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. After the Pickett 
collision he woke up at 2:00 a.m, the pain lasted longer and was 
more frequent. (Record at 578, page/line 31/17). Before the 
Pickett collision Dan need to exercise 2-3 times a week to 
resolve the pain in his back. (Record at 578, page/line 32/15). 
Since the Pickett collision Dan has to do the exercises everyday 
and his back still flares up. (Record at 578, page/line 33/18). 
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Further, Dan now has to do additional exercises to keep the pain 
in his back under control. (Record at 578, page/line 34/6). If 
Dan doesn't do the exercises he has severe pain which he 
attributes to the accident. (Record at 578, page/line 34/17). 
Since the Pickett collision Mr. Armstrong has to get up and move 
around after sitting for one and a half to two hours. He didn't 
have to get up and move around before the Pickett collision. 
(Record at 578, page/line 35/12). Over all Dan can't do the 
things he does as well as he did before the collision. (Record 
at 578, page/line 35/18) . Mr. Armstrong was referred for an MRI 
by his family physician, Scott Smith, for complaints of lower 
back pain. That scan was performed November 18, 1997. (Appendix 
at Tab D, bate stamp no. 104; Tab E, bate stamp no. 110). As a 
result of his back problems his chiropractor recommended that Dan 
get an orthopedic chair. (Appendix at exhibit 5.) Dan's total 
medical expenses arising from the Pickett collision were at least 
$3823.00. (Appendix at exhibit 3). 
At the time of the Pickett collision Jared Armstrong was 15. 
(Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp no. 1). In the collision Jared 
Armstrong's face was cut. (Record at 578, page/line 31/3). 
Jared underwent plastic surgery in an attempt to remove those 
scars. (Appendix at Tab F, bate stamp no. 135-140, 180-185). A 
photograph of Jared's scars, after the surgery, was admitted at 
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trial and shows that they remain. (Appendix at Tab F, bate stamp 
no. 148). Jared's scars are noticed by other people. (Record at 
578, page/line 73/18) . Jared incurred medical expenses of at 
least $2778.78 as a result of the Pickett collision. (Appendix 
at exhibit 4). 
At the time of the Pickett collision Taylor Armstrong was 6. 
(Appendix at Tab A, bate stamp no. 1). In the collision Taylor 
struck his head and lost consciousness. (Appendix at Tab H, bate 
stamp no. 217, 222). After the collision Taylor's parents became 
concerned about him. Taylor used to run but didn't after the 
accident. He forgot his "ABCs" and reading became a chore. 
(Record at 578, page/line 36/14). Taylor's parents noticed that 
his eye-hand coordination was off and that Taylor had to think 
about running. (Record at 578, page/line 37/21). He also has 
trouble kicking and throwing a ball. (Record at 578, page/line 
3 8/12) . The Armstrongs have had to work constantly with Taylor on 
his reading. They read with him in the morning before he goes to 
school to "get him started". (Record at 578, page/line 37/1). 
Taylor has seven siblings. (Record at 578, page/line 66/7). His 
parents have been involved in the education of all their children 
but they have to work a lot harder with Taylor. (Record at 578, 
page/line 66/17) . Taylor is behind his siblings in school work. 
(Record at 578, page/line 37/15). He has to work a lot harder 
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than his siblings do at school work. (Record at 578, page/line 
66/17). In July of 1999 the Armstrong's consulted Dr. Erin 
Bigler, a neuropsychologist. (Record at 578, page/line 57/23). 
Dr. Bigler tested and examined Taylor on June 27th and July 
9th of 1999. (Appendix at Tab M, bate stamp no. 470). Dr. 
Bigler testified that a positive loss of consciousness, like that 
Taylor sustained, is definitive for brain injury. (Record at 
578, page/line 78/11). Forgetting one's ABCs is a common 
difficulty in children with brain injury. (Record at 578, 
page/line 78/19). Continuing to experience problems three and one 
half half years after the accident indicates there are residual 
effects of the head injury. (Record at 578, page/line 79/6). 
The tests indicate Taylor suffers a left hemisphere brain injury 
which effects his language. (Record at 578, page/line 70/10). 
Taylor's verbal IQ was 89 but his performance IQ was 108, a 19 
point difference which is beyond the standard deviation and 
statistically different than what you would expect to see. 
(Record at 578, page/line 79/20). The statistical difference in 
conjunction with the testing performance suggests the left 
hemisphere brain injury. (Record at 578, page/line 80/6). Taylor 
took the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test and scored considerably 
above average. This with the other tests show that Taylor's 
problem is with reading, spelling & verbal analytical processing 
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and not visual verbal processing. (Record at 578, page/line 
81/8). Taylor also took the Wide Range Achievement Test which 
showed that Taylor is behind in reading and spelling. (Record at 
578, page/line 81/24). The result is that Taylor has a 
difference in his visual memory and verbal memory. (Record at 
578, page/line 82/4). Dr. Bigler's opinion is that Taylor 
suffered a verbal learning loss as a consequence of the head 
injury. There may be permanency to the deficit and he may not 
get back to the previous potential. (Record at 578, page/line 
82/18). If the problems persist he will not be successful in 
college and likely will not be able to pursue a variety of 
technical jobs in positions which will require complex verbal 
processing, reading, spelling, critical writing. The injury will 
dictate the kinds of jobs he can pursue. (Record at 578, 
page/line 82/25). It is more probable than not that Taylor's 
problems will continue. (Record at 578, page/line 83/10). 
People with Taylor's problems experience a higher frequency 
of neuropsychiatric problems like depression, heightened anxiety, 
and stress disorders. (Record at 578, page/line 83/19). There 
is also an increased risk for learning disabilities and learning 
problems. People with problems like Taylor's also have a tendency 
to be more impulsive, have problems with judgment & ability to 
sustain attention and concentration. (Record at 578, page/line 
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84/1). The testing showed problems verbal abilities. Reading, 
spelling vocabulary use and verbal comprehension were all down 
from his high average to superior rating in non-verbal abilities 
(Record at 578, page/line 84/24). Because of the problems 
associated with his injury Taylor will probably earn less income 
over his life than he would have had he not been injured. 
(Record at 578, page/line 85/16). Taylor may work around some of 
the problems but he will still not compete on a level with his 
peers. (Record at 578, page/line 85/17). Taylor's injury is, 
more probably than not, a permanent impairment. (Record at 578, 
page/line 86/1). The fact that he can compensate doesn't mean 
Taylor is not impaired. (Record at 578, page/line 86/2). 
Taylor's injury is a classic minor traumatic brain injury. You 
can have minor problems with monumental difficulties. (Record at 
578, page/line 86/19). People like Taylor may get somewhat 
better, they usually do and then have an absolute leveling off 
where a plateau is reached which is insurmountable thereafter. 
(Record at 578, page/line 89/2). Taylor's medical expenses 
associated with the Pickett collision were at least $7147.83. 
(Appendix, exhibit five). 
As a result of the collision the Armstrong vehicle, a 1992 
Suburban, was a total loss. (Appendix at Tab J, bate stamp no. 
2 74). Pickett claims that Armstrongs may not recover for this 
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loss because that claim was asserted by Dan Armstrong though the 
vehicle was titled to his wife, Appellant Lorene Armstrong. In 
fact Pickett's insurance company had already paid Appellant Dan 
Armstrong, on behalf of Pickett, part of the value of the vehicle 
by a check made payable to Dan Armstrong. (Appendix at Tab J, 
bate stamp no. 274). The other evidence pertaining to the 
vehicle showed that it was Dan Armstrong who paid for the add on 
items which increased the value of the vehicle and which were 
also lost in the collision. (Appendix at Tab J, bate stamp no. 
286 and at Tab X). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This matter was tried to the trial court. Appellate courts 
grant trial courts substantial discretion in such matters. 
Though Pickett objected to numerous proposed findings of fact 
those objections were not submitted for decision so the trial 
court did not have the opportunity to rule on them. 
Once Pickett's pleadings had been stricken and his default 
entered Armstrongs were entitled to recover whatever damages the 
evidence established. In particular, Utah's no-fault automobile 
insurance statute is an affirmative defense which was stricken 
with the rest of Pickett's pleadings. Even if the court finds 
that the no-fault statute is not an affirmative defense there is 
sufficient evidence to support the judgment based upon the 
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injuries suffered by each of the Armstrongs. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE APPELLATE STANDARD ON EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
A trial court's evidentiary rulings are subject to an of 
discretion standard. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 441 (Utah 
1996). Even if a court's evidentiary ruling is in error it will 
not be reversed on appeal unless the error is harmful. Jouflas v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1996). 
Harmful error occurs where the likelihood of a different outcome 
in the absence of the error is sufficiently high so as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 920 (Utah 1987). This standard has also been described as 
clear error. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, P17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. 
Applying this standard to the facts of this case this court must 
affirm the judgments of the trial court. 
II 
PICKETT'S POINTS OF ERROR WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
In his brief Pickett summarily concludes that his points on 
appeal were preserved for appeal by citing to various pages in 
the record where the issue was supposedly addressed. Pickett's 
terse discussion of these issues does not mean they were properly 
preserved for appeal. At the conclusion of trial proposed 
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findings of fact were submitted for the trial court's 
consideration. Pickett responded with an objection to 18 of 
those findings. (Record at 567). The text of that Objection, 
comprising a single page, merely listed the numbered paragraphs 
to which Pickett objected but provided no factual or legal basis 
for the objections. Further, despite the existence of Rule 4-
504, Utah Code Jud. Admin., which requires Pickett to advise the 
clerk to submit the objection to the trial court for 
consideration, no Notice to Submit for Decision was submitted. 
Pickett's terse objections do not meet the standard Utah 
courts require when a party seeks to preserve an issue for 
appeal. Before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the 
record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the 
trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." 
Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); see also Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 
129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (II,I!A matter is sufficiently raised if 
it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an 
opportunity to rule on the issue.111"). Moreover, the party must 
specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought "to a 
'level of consciousness' before the trial court." Hart, 945 P.2d 
at 130 (quoting James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987)). This requirement "serves the interests of judicial 
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economy and orderly procedure" by not only giving the trial court 
a chance to correct error, but by making the parties "crystallize 
issues prior to appeal." State v. Sixteen Thousand Dollars U.S. 
Currency, 914 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). When issues 
are not brought to the trial court's attention in a timely 
manner, they are "deemed waived, precluding the appellate court 
from considering their merits on appeal." Carlston, 776 P.2d at 
655. Pickett's objection to the findings, without allowing the 
trial court to consider them, do not meet this standard. 
This case is also legally akin to Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 
177 (Utah 1998). There the court cited Rule 4-502(2), Utah Code 
Jud. Admin., and held that a party was bound by an order to which 
it did not object. Here Pickett's objections were completely 
unsupported and cannot form the basis for preserving issues on 
appeal. 
Each of the points Pickett asserts on appeal was addressed 
in one of his Objections to Armstrong's Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. (Record at 567). Pickett's issue one is 
whether Dan Armstrong may recover for damage to his vehicle which 
happened to be titled in his wife's name. That factual issue is 
contained in the Findings at paragraph 11, record at 552, 
objected to by Pickett, without background or support. (Record at 
567) . 
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Pickett's issue two is whether Dan Armstrong and Jared 
Armstrong may recover for damages which Pickett claims do not 
meet the no-fault threshold. That factual issue is implicit in 
the Findings at paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 10, 25, 44, 44, and 45, 
record at 552-556, objected to by Pickett, without background or 
support. (Record at 567). 
Pickett's issue three is whether Dan Armstrong's prior back 
injury was aggravated by the collision. That factual issue is 
contained in the Findings at paragraph 5, record at 552. It was 
objected to by Pickett, without background or support. (Record at 
567) . 
Pickett's issue four is whether the scaring of Jared 
Armstrong is permanent, allowing him to recover in the face of 
Utah's no-fault statute. That factual issue is contained in the 
Findings at paragraphs 25 and 45, record at 554 and 556. It 
was objected to by Pickett, without background or support. 
(Record at 567). 
Pickett's issue five is whether the closed head brain injury 
suffered by Taylor Armstrong supports the damages the trial court 
awarded. That factual issue is contained in the Findings at 
paragraph 25-27, 30, 37, 39, 42, 43, and 46, record at 554-556, 
objected to by Pickett, without background or support. (Record at 
567) . 
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While Pickett may have discussed these issues tangentially 
at times during the trial nothing in the record indicates they 
were adequately presented so as to be brought "to a 'level of 
consciousness1 before the trial court." Hart, 945 P.2d at 130. 
Between the court's file, the transcript of the trial and the 
exhibits the record in this matter approaches 1500 pages. 
Pickett's brief comments are not sufficient to preserve the 
issues for trial in light of his complete failure to allow the 
trial court to focus on them succinctly as it could have had the 
objections to the Findings of Fact been supported and noticed. 
Ill 
PICKETT WAS DEFAULTED AND ARMSTRONGS 
WERE ENTITLED TO ALL DAMAGES AWARDED 
Pickett argues that Appellants Dan Armstrong and Jared 
Armstrong are not entitled to recover because their claims are 
barred by no-fault even though Pickett's pleadings, including all 
his defenses, were stricken. They are in error. 
Utah law on the effect of a default is long standing. 
A default on which a judgment may be rendered is an 
admission of every traversable allegation of the 
declaration or complaint necessary to plaintiff's cause 
of action, also, that defendant is the person named in 
the writ and intended to be served, and that the court 
has acquired jurisdiction of his person, and has 
jurisdiction of the cause of action, and also 
constitutes an admission of the due execution of the 
instrument sued on. Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bowman, 
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38 Utah 326, 113 P. 63 (Utah 1911). [emphasis added] 
Pickett was entitled to, and did, plead a defense derived 
from Utah's no-fault automobile insurance statute. That defense, 
along with all others, was stricken when the court entered its 
order striking his pleadings for his failure to participate in 
discovery. 
Pickett correctly quotes Utah Code Anno. 31A-22-309(1)(a)-
(e). However Pickett has ignored that section's companion 
provision of the code. Utah Code Anno. 41-12a-304 provides, 
u[t]he owner of a motor vehicle on which owner's or operator's 
security is required under Section 41-12a-301 who fails to have 
the security in effect at the time of an accident does not have 
immunity from tort liability under Subsection 31A-22-309(1)." 
This court has previously held that this language literally means 
what it says. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1200 
(Utah 1980). 
The result si that Pickett could fall into one of two 
groups. He could be properly insured and have tort immunity or 
he could be uninsured and not have immunity. That status, and 
the immunity associated with it, constituted an affirmative 
defense which was pled but was lost when Pickett's pleadings were 
stricken. Had Pickett appeared pro se or with counsel who had 
failed to plead the no-fault defense Armstrongs would have been 
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allowed to obtain judgment for all damages they sustained. After 
Pickett's pleadings were stricken he was in exactly that 
position. 
Pickett argues that holding that his insured status is an 
affirmative defense rather than jurisdictional and will in some 
fashion open the flood gates of unsanctioned litigation. That 
argument rings hollow. Those who have insurance and are sued 
know to take claims asserted against them to their insurance 
adjustors for defense by their carrier's hired counsel, like 
Pickett did. It is only the irresponsible who fail to maintain 
insurance, or who fail to participate in discovery, who should 
have any concern. The fact that this is a case of first 
impression shows there is no reasonable concern. 
This, and other courts, have held that similar sorts of 
statutory defenses are affirmative defenses. Ingraham v. United 
States, 808 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1987) (the statutory cap on 
medical malpractice damages was an affirmative defense which was 
waived when not pled); Brannan v. United Studen Aid Funds, Inc., 
94 F.3rd 1260 (9th Cir. 1996) (the government actor exemption to 
the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act was an affirmative 
defense which was waived when not pled); Freeman v. Chevron Oil 
Co., 517 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1975) (workers compensation was an 
affirmative defense which was waived when not pled); Pitts v. 
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Pine Mountain Ranch, Inc., 589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978) (Utah Code 
Anno. 78-13-1(1) specifying jurisdiction for real property 
actions could not be raised after default was taken). 
Pickett's no-fault defense was an affirmative defense. Once 
he was defaulted that defense was stricken. Any evidence as to 
that defense was evidence as to liability and not as to damages 
and was appropriately not considered by the trial court. 
IY 
PICKETT STIPULATED TO THE EVIDENCE 
At the beginning of the trial of this matter the parties 
presented the court a book of exhibits which they had previously 
complied and which they stipulated would be admitted and used by 
the court in trying the damages issues. (Record at pages 22 and 
23). The trial court accepted that stipulation and used the 
exhibits in issuing its findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment. In Utah evidence which is otherwise not admissible may 
be admitted and considered if the parties stipulate to its 
admission. State v. Abel, 600 P.2d 994, 998 (Utah, 1979); State 
v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775 (Utah, 1980); State v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d 
1232 (Utah, 1974); State v. Rowley, 15 Utah 2d 4, 386 P.2d 126 
(1963) . Because Pickett stipulated to the admission of the 
exhibit book the court was entitled to consider all the evidence 
contained in the book. 
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V 
PICKETT HAS NOT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings, an 
appellant must first marshal all the evidence that supports the 
trial court's findings. After marshaling the supporting 
evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's 
findings." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, P17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108; In 
re Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, 11 P.3d 284, note 6. 
Pickett lists a few of the facts supporting the judgment and 
then argues they were insufficient. Armstrongs invite the court 
to compare Pickett's Addendum, small excerpts of the evidence at 
trial, to theirs, all the evidence considered below. Pickett asks 
this court to look at the facts that supports his position and 
reweigh the evidence on that basis. Pickett's exercise before 
this court fails for the reason described by this court at note 6 
of Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 (Utah 1998) 
[I]f nine eyewitnesses testify that the stop light was 
red and one eyewitness testifies that it was green, the 
jury may choose to believe the one eyewitness. The fact 
that the jury chose to believe the one instead of the 
nine is not enough to establish that the verdict was 
"'completely lacking or so slight and unconvincing as 
to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. 
The trial court is entitled to the same deference. 
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Pickett's efforts to marshal the evidence in this matter 
fail in that they, by themselves, show that there is sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's findings and therefore the 
judgments. When the evidence Pickett omitted is added it is 
clear that the trial court's determination must be upheld. 
VI 
ARMSTRONGS MET THE NO- FAULT THRESHOLD 
Notwithstanding the fact that Appellants Dan and Jared 
Armstrong did not need to meet the no-fault threshold because 
Pickett's pleadings had been stricken they met the threshold 
nonetheless. 
A 
JARED ARMSTRONG'S SCARS 
1 
THE SCARS ARE DISFIGURING 
Pickett argues that Jared Armstrong's scars are not 
sufficiently disfiguring to meet the no-fault threshold set by 
Utah Code Anno. 31A-22-309(1)(d). Pickett does cite a standard 
for determining which scars are disfiguring and which are not. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines disfigurement as "an impairment or 
injury to the appearance of a person or thing." 480 (7th ed. 
1999). Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary defines 
disfigurement as, "2. anything that disfigures or defaces; 
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blemish; defect; deformity." [emphasis added] Jared and his 
mother both described the scars as disfiguring. 
The evidence at trial, on the scars, was as follows. In the 
collision Jared Armstrong's face was cut. (Record at 578, 
page/line 31/3) . Jared underwent plastic surgery in an attempt 
to remove those scars. (Appendix at Tab F, bate stamp no. 135-
140, 180-185). A photograph of Jared's scars, after the surgery, 
was admitted at trial and shows that they remain. (Appendix at 
Tab F, bate stamp no. 148). Jared's scars are noticed by other 
people. (Record at 578, page/line 73/18). The scars clearly 
disfigure and meet the no-fault threshold. 
2 
PICKETT ACKNOWLEDGED AT TRIAL THAT THE SCARS MET THE THRESHOLD 
In his opening statement at trial Pickett did not take the 
position that Jared's scars did not meet the no-fault threshold. 
Instead, at trial, (Record at 578, page/line 12/12), Pickett's 
counsel discussed Jared's scars with the court. There he said 
"That the two boys, that this claim, I guess there's a question 
on whether or not Taylor has a permanent impairment, permanent 
injury, but they both received scarring and under the threshold 
requirements a permanent disfigurement is, I guess, then through 
the threshold." 
Further during colloquy with the court on the no-fault issue 
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counsel again did not argue that Jared's scars did not meet the 
no-fault threshold. At that point he only made that argument as 
to Dan's injuries. (Record at 578, page/line 16/11). Rather 
than tell the court that Jared's scars were not permanently 
disfiguring within the purview of the code he acknowledged that 
they were. 
Later in closing argument Pickett could have raised the no-
fault defense but did not. There, rather than argue that Jared's 
injuries were not sufficiently serious to meet the no-fault 
threshold Pickett merely argued that Jared could not recover the 
sums which had already been paid by PIP. nWe don't dispute that 
Jared's medical expenses were $2,778.78. That amount, however, 
was all paid for by the PIP carrier that we discussed earlier. 
We don't believe he's entitled to recover those amounts again in 
this action." (Record at 578, page/line 96/14-18). 
Before the trial court Pickett did not argue that Jared's 
scars did not meet the no-fault threshold. He cannot raise the 
failure to meet the threshold argument now. 
1 
DAN ARMSTRONGS INJURIES ARE PERMANENT 
The evidence at trial on Dan Armstrong's injuries was as 
follows. In the collision Dan Armstrong was struck in the lower 
back. (Record at 578, page/line 30/22-24) . Mr. Armstrong had 
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suffered an injury to his back in a prior motor vehicle accident. 
(Record at 578, page/line 31/25-32/2). The prior damage to his 
back was exacerbated by the collision at issue in this case. As 
a result of the prior injury Dan awoke at 3:30 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. 
After the Pickett collision he started to wake up at 2:00 a.m. 
The pain lasted longer and was more frequent. (Record at 578, 
page/line 31/17) . Before the Pickett collision Dan need to 
exercise 2-3 times a week to resolve the pain in his back. 
(Record at 578, page/line 32/15) . After the Pickett collision he 
has to do the exercises everyday and his back still flares up. 
(Record at 578, page/line 33/18) . Further, he now has to do 
additional exercises to keep the pain under control. (Record at 
578, page/line 34/6). If he doesn't do the exercises he has 
severe pain which he attributes to the accident. (Record at 578, 
page/line 34/17). At work Mr. Armstrong has to get up and move 
around after sitting for one and a half to two hours. He didn't 
have to get up and move around before the Pickett collision. 
(Record at 578, page/line 35/12). Over all he can't do the 
things he does as well as he did before the collision. (Record 
at 578, page/line 35/18). Mr. Armstrong was referred for an MRI 
by his family physician, Scott Smith, for complaints of lower 
back pain. That scan was performed November 18, 1997. (Appendix 
at Tab D, bate stamp no. 104; Tab E, bate stamp no. 110). As a 
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result of his back problems his chiropractor recommended that Dan 
get an orthopedic chair. (Appendix at exhibit 5.) Dan's total 
medical expenses arising from the Pickett collision were at least 
$3823.00. (Appendix at exhibit 3). 
While Dan Armstrong did not have a physician testify that he 
suffered a specific percentage impairment of the whole man as is 
often seen in personal injury trials there was nonetheless 
objective testimony of his permanent impairment. The trial was 
held almost four years following the collision. At that time Dan 
Armstrong was still experiencing pain and limitation from the 
collision. That is evidence of a permanent impairment. 
Pickett argues that Dr. Smith's chart on Dan did not show 
any evidence of complaints of back pain arising from the 
accident. However evidence at trial showed that there were 
omissions in Dr. Smith's chart. Dan's medical records showed 
that he had been referred by Dr. Smith for an MRI because of pain 
in his lower back which had persisted since the collision even 
though there was no reference in Dr. Smith's records of that MRI 
referral. The radiology report confirmed damage to Dan's back. 
(Appendix at Tab D, bate stamp no. 103) (Record at 578, 
page/line 60/24-61/5) . While this may not be as much evidence a 
Pickett would have liked it was nonetheless a preponderance in 
the trial court's mind. 
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VII 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENTS 
A 
THE TAYLOR ARMSTRONG PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT 
Pickett argues that this court should revisit the judgment 
awarded Taylor Armstrong. Armstrongs' version of the facts show 
Taylor suffering a significant loss in his verbal abilities as a 
result of Pickett's driving while he was drunk. That means that 
not only will Taylor not be able to read for the sake of 
enjoyment he will not be able to obtain the more lucrative types 
of employment where reading is a central skill. Dr. Bigler's 
description was that the injury is the type which has "monumental 
consequences./; The trial court obviously believed Armstrongs' 
version of the facts. Having believed that version of the facts 
a verdict for $350,000.00 in general damages is not inordinately 
high. It may be low. 
B 
THE JARED ARMSTRONG PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT 
Armstrongs' version of Jared's injuries is that they 
embarrass him and they are permanent. Again, it is apparent the 
trial court accepted Armstrongs' version. The fact that Jared 
will be embarassed by those scars for the next 50 years supports 
a verdict for $10,000.00 in general damages. 
24 
c 
THE DANIEL ARMSTRONG PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT 
The Armstrongs' version of Dan's injuries is that they cause 
him pain daily and restrict his ability to make a living. Again, 
it is apparent the trial court accepted Armstrongs' version. The 
fact that Dan will be called upon to suffer from this collision 
for the rest of his life supports a verdict for $10,000.00 in 
general damages. 
D 
THE DANIEL ARMSTRONG PROPERTY JUDGMENT 
Pickett argues that the trial court could not award Dan 
Armstrong a judgment for damage to the Suburban because he had 
put it in his wife's name. This argument ignores the reality of 
modern life and Utah law. The evidence showed that, even though 
the vehicle was titled in Lorene Armstrong's name all of the 
receipts for improvements and work on the car were in Dan's name. 
Lorene is a party to this suit, acting as the guardian ad litem 
for her minor sons. Pickett's insurance company didn't quibble 
about the title when they made a partial payment for the loss. 
Utah law provides that Dan has a sufficient interest in the 
Suburban to allow him to sue for its loss. The Suburban was 
marital property. Marital property encompasses all of the assets 
of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and 
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from whatever source derived. Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14 1[l9, 
973 P.2d 988. Dan Armstrong suffered a loss when the Suburban 
was destroyed whether it was in his name or not. The trial court 
appropriately awarded him a judgment for its loss. 
VIII 
COUNSEL MUST SHOW PROOF THAT THEY HAVE AUTHORITY TO APPEAR 
After this action was filed Armstrongs filed a motion under 
Utah Code Anno. 78-51-33 to require counsel to prove that they 
had authority to appear on Pickett's behalf. That motion was 
based on the fact that Pickett had failed to appear for his 
deposition and at trial. (Record at 578, page 1). Counsel never 
did provide any documentation from Pickett showing authority nor 
did they "prove by [their] own oath" that they had that 
authority. Instead they relied upon the fact that they had been 
hired by Pickett's insurance company and that was sufficient 
authorization. 
The fact that Pickett refused to appear for his deposition 
or for trial is a clear indication that he did not want to be 
involved in this matter further. Without authorization, counsel 
should not be allowed to proceed on his behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in the 
trial of this matter. Each of the trial court's findings of fact 
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and conclusions of law are adequately supported by the record. 
The judgments awarded are proper. Pickett is entitled to an 
offset for sums previously paid by his insurance company for the 
total loss of the Armstrongs' vehicle. Similarly he is entitled 
to an offset for sums paid by the Armstrongs' carrier for PIP as 
Armstrongs acknowledged at trial. This appeal should be 
dismissed, the judgments awarded by the trial court affirmed and 
the Armstrongs awarded their costs. 
Dated this 13th day of December, 2001. 
Robert H. Wilde 
Attorney for Appellees 
ADDENDUM 
The Armstrongs' Addendum is bound separately and filed herewith. 
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